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I. INTRODUCTION
By virtue of the authority vested in the President by Section
5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended ... and in view
of the continued existence of the national emergency declared
by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950, and the im-
portance of strengthening the balance of payments position of
the United States during the national emergency, it is hereby
ordered .... I
With these words, President Johnson, on January 1, 1968, announced the
first mandatory restrictions on private investment abroad in the history
of the United States.2 The purpose of these restrictions was to reduce
the United States balance of payments deficit, as derived from "direct in-
vestment" capital transactions in the International Monetary Fund re-
ports, by one billion dollars in 1968.8 The United States has had a balance
of payments deficit in every year but two since 1946. These deficits are
largely the result of military and foreign aid spending since the United
States normally has a surplus in its balance of foreign trade account.
However, in the sixties, military spending increased and the trade surplus
decreased. Consequently, the United States balance of payments situation
has significantly worsened.
The mandatory direct investment restriction program was intended
to replace the voluntary foreign investment restriction program that was
proposed by the President in 1965. The voluntary program was generally
* J.D., 1968, University of Michigan. Mr. Giles is a member of the law firm of Gardner
and Thomson, Miami, Florida.
1. Exec. Order No. 11387, 33 Fed. Reg. 47 (1968).
2. Morris, The New Regulations Governing Direct Foreign Investment-An Early
Appraisal, 23 Bus. LAW. 701 (1968).
3. FORaGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REOULATIONS, Practising Law Institute 9 (1968).
[Hereinafter referred to as FDIR].
4. The balance of payments deficit for 1967 was 3.6 billion dollars. The President in
his January 1, 1968 message announced the goal of reducing that deficit by three billion
dollars in 1968. The mandatory direct investment restriction program was only a part of
the total package and was intended to reduce the deficit by one billion dollars in 1968. Ad-
dress by Don C. Cadle, Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments, First
National Bank Building, Dallas, Texas, August 22, 1968, at 1.
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considered to be successful but its application was limited to banks and to
the 700 largest corporations in the United States.
This article will examine first, the statutory basis for the mandatory
regulations; second, the general pattern of the regulations; third, the
relationship of the regulations with U.S. tax law; and finally, a discussion
of the constitutionality and future of the regulations.
II. STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE REGULATIONS
Executive Order No. 11387 and the Foreign Direct Investment Regu-
lations were enacted under the authority of section 5 (b) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Presidential Proclamation No. 2914 of
1950. Section 5(b) was an amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act
and provided in its original form that the President could investigate,
regulate or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange, coin exports, or
property transfers between the United States and any foreign country or
between residents of any foreign country and persons within the United
States.5 The Act, which was a wartime measure, was adopted to prevent
the Axis powers form benefiting from the seizure of American property
and to prohibit United States citizens from assisting the Axis powers by
the transfer of property or foreign exchange.
Section 5(b) was amended in March, 1933, and provided that the
President would have the same regulatory powers during "any other pe-
riod of national emergency."' The 1933 amendment also provided for
criminal penalties for willful violation of any provision of the section or
any license, order, rule or regulation issued thereunder. The possible pen-
alty was, and is, a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars or ten years in
jail, or both.7 The purpose of the 1933 amendment was to give the Presi-
dent added power during the banking crisis of March, 1933.8
Section 5(b) was again amended on May 7, 1940. This amendment
provided that the President could regulate any transfer by any "banking
institution . . . of, or dealing in, any evidences or indebtedness or . . .
property in which any foreign state or a national or political subdivision
thereof ... has any interest . . . ."' This amendment again added to the
5. 40 Stat. 415 (1917).
6. 48 Stat. 1 (1933).
7. Id.
8. Beginning in mid-February, 1933, state after state had closed its banks to prevent
runs by panic-stricken investors. In the eight days preceding March 3, 1933, 1.5 billion dol-
lars in currency had been withdrawn from banks that were still open. On that date, the Presi-
dent had an emergency conference at the White House and issued a Proclamation closing all
banks for four days on the basis of his power under section 5(b). At the same time, the
President called the Congress into Emergency Session on March 9th. On that date the Con-
gress passed the Administration's Emergency Banking Bill, which in its preamble, stated that
the "actions . . . by the President of the United States or the Secretary of Treasury since
March 4, 1933, pursuant to the authority conferred by subdivision (b) of Section 5 of the
Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and confirmed." (48 Stat. 1) 22
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 805 (1963).
9. 54 Stat. 179 (1940).
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presidential powers in the area of "freezing foreign assets" and likewise
sought to prevent the Axis powers from obtaining any benefit from the
seizure of American property.
The last and final amendment to section 5(b) was on December 18,
1941. The amendment allowed the President to designate "any agency"
to:
(A) Investigate, regulate or prohibit, any transaction in for-
eign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between,
by, through or to any banking institution ... and
(B) Investigate, regulate, direct or compel, nullify and void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding,... transfer,
withdrawal . . . or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power, or privilege, with respect to, or transactions involv-
ing, any property which any foreign country or national
thereof has any interest.'0
Again the purpose of this amendment was to strengthen the Presi-
dent's power in controlling American owned foreign assets that could
benefit the Axis powers and also to control transactions concerning any
property in which any foreign national had any interest. The Act was not
clear in its impact on property that was wholly owned by American citi-
zens except that the designated agency, under the powers of subpart A,
could regulate any transfer through any "banking institution."
Section 5(b) as amended, was first construed by the United States
Supreme Court in Propper v. Clark." The American Society of Compos-
ers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) owed a debt to a similar society
in Austria (AKM). The debt was subject to a "freezing order" issued by
the President on June 14, 1941 pursuant to section 5(b). A dispute arose
between the Office of Alien Property Custodian and the receiver appointed
in the New York Courts to handle the property of AKM. The Court held
for the Office of Alien Property Custodian, finding that ASCAP was a
"banking institution" within the definition of the Act, and that the Act
should be broadly construed. The Court commented on the policy of the
Act as follows:
Through the Trading with The Enemy Act in its various
forms, the nation sought to deprive enemies, actual or potential,
of the opportunity to secure advantages to themselves, or to per-
petuate wrongs against the United States or its citizens through
the use of assets that happened to be in this country. To do so
has necessitated some inconvenience to our citizens and others
who, as here, are not involved in any actions adverse to the na-
tion's interest. That fact, however, cannot lead us to narrow the
broad coverage of the executive order ... 
10. 55 Stat. 839 (1941). (Emphasis supplied.)
11. 337 U.S. 472 (1948).
12. Id. at 482. (Emphasis supplied.)
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In addition to section 5 (b), President Johnson used the Presidential
Proclamation No. 2914 of December 19, 1950 to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a national emergency which enabled him to have the Commerce
Department issue without hearings the Foreign Direct Investment Regu-
lation. This Proclamation declared a national emergency because the
"recent events in Korea ... constitute a grave threat to the peace of the
world.' 3 President Truman justified his actions on the basis that the
threat of Communist imperialism and aggression threatened the people of
the United States with their right "to engage freely in their own business
enterprises and the many other freedoms and rights which are part of
our way of life . . ,,14
Later we will examine more carefully and criticize the regulations
and their statutory authority but, as we go through the description of
the regulations and their tax impact, the following questions should be
considered: 1) What is the relationship between the words and policy of
the Trading with The Enemy Act and the FDIR? 2) What is the relation-
ship between the Presidential Proclamation concerning Korea and the
FDIR? and 3) Are any Congressional controls needed in the areas of
Presidential powers during a national emergency, and the continuing
periods of those emergencies?
III. GENERAL PATTERN OF THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
REGULATIONS (FDIR)
The FDIR provide:
1. Section 1000.201 (a) (2): New direct investment outflows to
continental Europe and certain developed countries (sched-
ule C countries) are prohibited.
2. Section 1000.504(a) (2): New net investment in other devel-
oped countries (schedule B) is limited to 65% of the average
of 1965-1966, investment in those countries.
3. Section 1000.504(a) (1): New net investment in the develop-
ing countries (schedule A) is limited to 110% of the average
of the 1965-1966 investment in those countries.
4. Section 1000.305: A "direct investor" is defined as any per-
son within the United States who directly or indirectly owns
or acquires 10% or more of the total combined voting power
of any affiliated foreign national.
5. Section 1000.304: An affiliated foreign national is very
broadly defined to include any subject or citizen of, or any
person domiciled or resident in, a foreign country or any
branch, subsidiary, division, partnership, etc. of any United
States person or corporation engaged in trade or business in
a foreign country.
13. 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950).
14. Id.
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6. Section 1000.503: Any "direct investor" may invest a maxi-
mum of $200,000 per year in any or all scheduled countries.' 5
7. Section 1000.504(a) (3): In any schedule C country (gener-
ally Western Europe except United Kingdom) the direct
investor may only reinvest his share of the earnings of an
incorporated affiliated foreign national (AFN) which is the
lesser of (a) 35% of the average of direct investment in
1965 and 1966 or (b) multiplying his share of the earnings
by a fraction the numerator of which is the amount rein-
vested in the years 1964-1966 and the denominator of which
is his share of the total earnings in 1964-1966.
8. Any direct investor, who (a) had no direct investments in
any schedule C country during 1965-1966, or (b) did not
reinvest any earnings during the years 1964-1966, may not
reinvest any earnings from his share of an incorporated
affiliated foreign national.
As a result of these regulations, direct investment in Western Europe
is generally limited for any American person or corporation to $200,000
per year. However, the regulation is not as severe an impediment to an
American investor as it might be since foreign borrowings are exempt
from direct investment. The large American investor can avoid the regu-
lations by borrowing capital in Eurodollars overseas with the American
investor or corporation as a guarantor of the loan. 6 In fact, it appears
that the FDIR will have a stimulating effect on the European capital mar-
ket as it forces American investors to raise capital for foreign expansion
overseas. Don Cadle, Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Direct
Investments, has stated that in 1967, between 1.0 and 1.5 billion dollars
of foreign debt was incurred by American business which otherwise might
have been financed in the United States. He estimated that in 1968,
United States business will raise or establish credit facilities abroad of
between 4.5 and 5.0 billion dollars. 7 A large percentage of this growth,
between 343% and 500%, can be attributed to the restrictions of the
FDIR. Unfortunately, the expansion of the European capital market can
only be a temporary solution to the American balance of payments prob-
lems because as the demand for foreign capital increases, interest rates
will rise and widen the gap between American and foreign rates.'
15. The de minimis limitation was originally $100,000. It was raised to $200,000 on
August 14, 1968, and to $300,000 for calendar year 1969. U.S. Dept. of Commerce News,
Nov. 15, 1968.
16. Prior to the date of the borrowing, the American investor must get a certificate from
the Office of Foreign Direct Investments. To obtain the certificate, the investor must in an
affidavit allege that (a) the loan will be repaid without any positive direct investment or,
(b) that the guaranty will not be met for at least seven years. FDIR § 1000.1002(a)(6),
33 Fed. Reg. 11268 (1968).
17. Address by Don C. Cadle, supra note 4, at 7.
18. At present, the American prime rate is 7%. The closest European equivalent to our
prime rate is the Eurodollar rate which is a flexible rate set by trading in Eurodollars among
European banks. At present, the Eurodollar rate is approximately 7/4t%. London banks will
lend Eurodollars at approximately 1% to 1'/T% above the Eurodollar rate. Therefore, the
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Despite the fact that the regulations will help develop the European
capital market, they can be justifiably criticized since they penalize those
investors who attempted to follow the policies and procedures of the vol-
untary investment restriction program. Any investor who attempted to
limit his foreign investments in 1965-1966, or who repatriated earnings
during 1964-1966 in order to assist in the balance of payments deficit is
in a poorer position than if he had invested as much as he could and had
reinvested all earnings and repatriated nothing. This policy paradox is
caused because the regulations measure what an investor can do now by
what he did generally during the years 1964-1966. The more active he
was in foreign investments during this period (and conversely the more
he ignored the voluntary program) the higher is his base period, and,
therefore, the higher is his possible investment or reinvestment or both
without repatriation and taxation.
The regulations, in addition, penalize the small or new investor in the
European market since he can only invest $200,000 per year and he must
repatriate and pay tax on all affiliated foreign earnings in schedule C
countries.
IV. IMPACT oF FDIR ON TAX LAW AND TAX PLANNING
The major impact of the FDIR on tax law and tax planning is the
restrictions on reinvestments with the effect that foreign earnings must be
repatriated as dividends. These dividends when repatriated to a United
States investor are fully taxable under the Internal Revenue Code. One
of the major reasons for investing abroad was the opportunity to reinvest
capital without United States taxation. That advantage, at least for sched-
ule C countries, is now minimized to 35% of the foreign earnings and
even that advantage is distorted since it arbitrarily depends on base period
investments and dividend experience.19
The regulations specifically state that:
European prime rate can be considered to be approximately 8/41% to 9/4%. Thus, the Euro-
pean prime rate is approximately 1% to 1 % higher than the American prime rate, but the
European banks do not charge compensating balances. If an American investor borrows 2
million dollars from an American bank, he would probably have to maintain at least 15%
compensating balances and, therefore, could only use 1.7 million dollars of his loan; however,
since he must pay interest on the full 2.0 million dollars, his effective interest rate is 9.41%.
With the additional factor of compensating balances, the American and European interest
rates are approximately equal. However, this equality will not be maintained for long because
1) American interest rates will probably decline as the full impact of the income tax sur-
charge is measured, and 2) European interest rates will increase because of the heavy demand
for Eurodollars. It should also be noted that at least some experts feel that the expansion of
the Eurodollar market will have an adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments problem.
The theory is that foreign investors are buying Eurodollar bonds and convertibles with the
proceeds of their sales of American securities. One Swiss banker has stated that "the recent
Chrysler issues (Chrysler Overseas Capital Corp., 60 million dollars, 4Y4% Eurodollar con-
vertibles, issued May, 1968) were in a large measure bought with money realized from the
sales of Chrysler shares." Ball, The Bond Americans Can't Buy, FORTuNE Sept. 15, 1968,
at 167.
19. FDIR § 1000.504(a) (3), 33 Fed. Reg. 8659 (1968).
MANDATORY INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
A direct investor will not be authorized to reinvest any portion
of its share of earnings . . . if the average of direct investment
by the direct investor in all affiliated foreign nationals in sched-
ule C countries during the years 1965 and 1966 was zero or a
negative amount, or if the average of the direct investor's share
in the reinvested earnings of incorporated affiliated foreign na-
tionals ... during the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 was zero or a
negative amount.2"
This regulation seems to unnecessarily penalize both the small inves-
tor who is just getting started in the European market and did not have
any base period experience, and the American investor who suffered losses
during the base period years. This is because both investors must repatri-
ate all earnings in the form of dividends and pay American tax on those
dividends. The regulation, furthermore, contradicts the congressional plan
for certain minimum distributions of earnings by controlled foreign cor-
porations under section 963 of the Internal Revenue Code.
A second impact of the forced dividends requirement is that some
countries, such as Brazil and Taiwan, impose a higher income tax on dis-
tributed profits.2 Further, because most countries put an additional
withholding tax on dividends, it is possible that the American investor
may not be able to use the full foreign tax credit because of the limitation
contained in section 904 of the Internal Revenue Code.22
The regulations also have an effect on the subpart F of the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 9 54(b) (3) exempts controlled foreign corporations
from taxation under subpart F if the "foreign base company income" is
less than 30% of gross income. It is possible that the 30% tainted income
rule can be violated by mandatory repatriation and subject the American
investor to having a pro rata share of such income included in his own
gross income under section 951(a) (1).
2
1
It is not known at this time what will be the position of the Internal
Revenue Service as to the mandatory repatriation provisions of the FDIR.
One can assume that they will treat as dividends those sums repatriated
to the United States even if that repatriation is more than required by
section 963 of the Code. It is known that the OFDI is not interested or
20. FDIR § 1000.504(a) (3) (b), 33 Fed. Reg. 8659 (1968). (Emphasis supplied.)
21. BERENS, TAX PROBLEMS CREATED BY FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS,
Practising Law Institute, at 86 (1968).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 88. As an example of how confusing the mixture of the foreign investment
regulations and the tax law can become, assume that a direct investor transfers $1,000,000
from his Dutch subsidiary to his English sibsidiary for working capital needs. Since the
transfer was across schedule countries, from C to B, the OFDI would treat the transfer as
a repatriation of earnings by the Dutch subsidiary (affiliated foreign national) to the Ameri-
can parent (Direct Investor) and a direct investment from the American parent to the En-
glish subsidiary. It is unclear at this time whether the IRS will also treat the transfer as a
dividend to the American parent and tax the $1,000,000 even though none of the money ever
was or was intended to be transferred to the United States. See FDIR § 1000.505(a), 33 Fed.
Reg. 11706 (1968).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
concerned with the tax impact of the regulations. Their position and pol-
icy is that they must reduce the balance of payments deficit by one billion
dollars in 1968 and that the incidental tax consequences to their actions
are really irrelevant to their basic policy goal.24 It would seem that the
goal of the OFDI could be achieved by having the affiliated foreign na-
tionals either place their earnings in foreign branches of American banks
or allow them to invest in American securities, without mandatory repatri-
ation to the parent; yet, the regulations do not allow such alternatives.
Even though our balance of payments problem is serious, it seems rather
cavalier to ignore the tax consequences and foolish not to attempt to work
out the policy conflicts between the OFDI and the IRS.
V. FUTURE OF THE REGULATIONS
The above discussion of some of the tax effects of the regulations
should give the reader an idea of how the regulations have changed
the application of the Internal Revenue Code to the area of international
taxation. We now turn to an examination of whether such changes in the
tax law are or should be valid because of regulations issued by the Com-
merce Department.
The first question is whether the regulations are constitutional. The
issue is not whether the Congress has the power to regulate foreign invest-
ment for it clearly does under article 1, section 8.5 Rather the proper
inquiry is whether the President has the power to regulate such invest-
ments under the Trading with the Enemy Act and whether the regulations
issued by a federal agency under that power can contradict the congres-
sional tax scheme.
The Attorney General has stated in a letter to the Secretary of Com-
merce that he believes the regulations are constitutional:
My view is supported by four considerations: 1) the clear lan-
guage of the statute, 2) the historical precedents of executive
action under Section 5(b) over the past thirty-five years, to-
gether with the Acts of Congress and judicial decisions which
have sustained the President's authority under the statute, 3)
the continued existence of a national emergency declared by
24. However, note that section 1000.203 of the FDIR which provides for the reduction
and repatriation of liquid foreign balances states that the direct investor may submit a cer-
tificate to obtain a specific exemption if the regulation "would have created a substantial
probability of material adverse United States or foreign tax consequences to the direct inves-
tor." FDIR § 1000.203(d) (2), 33 Fed. Reg. 8659 (1968).
25. The Supreme Court stated in Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303
(1935) that:
[Tihe broad and comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue,
finance and currency is derived from the aggregate of the powers granted to Con-
gress, embracing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, to coin money, and
regulate the value thereof ... and the added express power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the other enumerated
powers.
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President Truman in Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16,
1950, and 4) the relation of the precedents under Section 5 (b)
to the present exercise of executive authority. 6
Admittedly, the language of the statute is broad, but is not clear. The
statute says in subpart A that the President or the designated agency
"Imay investigate, regulate or prohibit ... transfers of credit or payments
between, by, or through, or to any banking institution ....,,27 As previ-
ously noted, in Propper v. Clark the Supreme Court broadly construed the
words "banking institution" and considered that ASCAP was such an
institution.2" It is unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court would
consider all of the corporations and individuals in America who have more
than a 10% interest in a foreign operation as "banking institutions."
Clearly, the Supreme Court was willing to stretch the congressional lan-
guage in order to arrive at a result consistent with the clear congressional
intent of preserving American assets from its enemies under the freezing
asset doctrine. It is not clear, however, that the Supreme Court would
apply the same statutory construction when the impact of the regulations
is most strongly against America's allies (schedule C countries) and
when the freezing assets doctrine clearly does not apply.2
Subpart B of the statute states that the President or the designated
agency may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, pre-
vent or prohibit, any acquisition holding ... transfer . . . or transaction
involving any property in which any foreign country or national thereof
has any interest."3 Again the congressional intent was the protection of
the United States interests of foreign assets held in the United States
under the freezing assets doctrine. Certainly one can question whether a
"foreign country or national thereof has any interest" in a foreign subsid-
iary or branch which is owned 100% by an American investor and whose
only interest or contact with the foreign country is its physical location
or act of incorporation.
The Attorney General's position as to the constitutionality of the
26. Foreign Direct Investment-Rates of Application, 186 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
A-1, Bureau of National Affairs (1968).
27. 55 Stat. 839 (1941).
28. It is interesting to note the definition of "banking institution" under the FDIR
§ 1000.311, 33 Fed. Reg. 49 (1968): "[T]he term banking institution shall include any person
engaged primarily or incidentally in the business of banking, or granting or transferring credits,
or of purchasing or selling foreign exchange or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof . .. "
This regulation, however, was revoked in the reprint of the regulations published, August 31,
1968.
29. The Regulations make it clear that the freezing assets doctrine does not apply.
FDIR § 1000.201(c), 33 Fed. Reg. 8659 (1968), states:
Nothing contained in this part shall be construed to limit the right of a person in
the United States to make a bona fide transfer of capital or earnings in the ordinary
course of business to a foreign national in respect to an interest in such person held
by such foreign national.
Thus, under this regulation the prohibited transfer in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1948),
would be completely legal under the FDIR.
30. 55 Stat. 839 (1941). (Emphasis supplied.)
1969]
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regulations was based upon the acts of Congress and judicial decisions
over 35 years which have sustained the President's authority and the rela-
tion of those decisions to the present exercise of executive authority. We
have already demonstrated that section 5(b) was enacted during the first
World War and it was then amended during the banking crisis of 1933
and the beginning of World War II. In each instance, the President went
to the Congress not to have his Act sustained, but rather to have his
power broadened so that he could act and deal with the crisis. Constitu-
tional inquiry of the FDIR does not relate to the balance of payments
crisis; rather, it is asserted that the Executive should have followed its
own historical precedent and approached Congress for the statutory au-
thority to deal with the crisis.
The judicial precedents simply do not support the Attorney General's
position. The cases either have to do with the "freezing assets doctrine"'"
which clearly does not apply to the impact and policy of the mandatory
restrictions, or the illegal possession or sale of gold which is clearly irrele-
vant. 2
The Attorney General's third argument in support of the constitution-
ality of the regulations is based on the continued existence of a national
emergency as declared by President Truman on December 16, 1950. We
have already discussed that the language of this proclamation, which dealt
with the Korean War, does not apply to the mandatory restrictions.
Clearly the Korean War is not the cause of our present balance of pay-
ments difficulties. One can argue that Communist imperialism and aggres-
sion in Vietnam is a cause of our problem, but the regulations are aimed
not at that aggression or imperialism, but at our strongest allies. It seems
attenuated to argue that a war in 1950 is justification for severe economic
restraints in 1968. As the Court stated in Bauer v. United States:
It seems vital as a matter of national policy that emergency
regulations and almost dictatorial powers granted or conceded
in the turmoil of war, cold war, economic revolution and the
struggle to preserve a balanced democratic way of life, should
be discarded upon return to normal conditions, lest we grow
used to them as the fittings of ordinary existence."3
The issue is more fundamental than the fact that the President should
31. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1948); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966); Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
32. See Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Bauer v. United States, 244
F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Ruffino v. United States, 114 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1940).
33. 244 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1957). It would be possible to set up some statutory pro-
cedure for the control of national emergency declarations. After the President has declared
a national emergency, he could go to the Congress for approval, as President Roosevelt did
in March, 1933. The Congress could then attach some specific time limitation to the emer-
gency declaration so that the emergency powers would automatically expire unless the Presi-
dent went again to the Congress for an extension. Such a procedure is very similar to the
procedure now used to set statutory ceilings on the national debt.
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have declared a national emergency as to the problems in Vietnam. That
fact would make the national emergency basis of the mandatory regula-
tions more defensible, but it would not change the fundamental question
of whether the Executive has the statutory authority to enact regulations
restricting foreign investment.3 4
The discussion relating to the constitutionality of the regulations
may be moot since there is no evidence at this time that the regulations
will ever be tested in court. It is the position of the OFDI that no one
can violate the regulations until January 1, 1969, as the restrictions on
investment are viewed in terms of a calendar year. Thus, the investor who
makes a direct investment in schedule C countries in excess of the de
minimis limitation is within the scope of the regulations if he returns his
investment to the United States before December 31, 1968.85
Don Cadle, Deputy Director of the OFDI, has stated that the OFDI
"will have to tighten the application of the regulations wherever abuses
appear.1 30 He also said that the OFDI "will have to commence some com-
pliance actions." ' However, the commencement of the compliance actions
does not mean that the regulations will be attacked in litigation. Although
an attack on the constitutionality is an obvious defense, there is some pos-
sibility that there will be no defense at all. The reason for this paradox is
that to the American businessman, the strength of the dollar is simply
more important than noncompliance with the regulations. The risk of
devaluation of the dollar and the possible resulting profit and investment
loss is so great that it simply outweighs the inconvenience and policy con-
flicts in the regulations. American business is more concerned with the
strenthening of the dollar through the reduction in our balance of pay-
ments deficit and then the abolishment of the OFDI.
34. One must recognize, however, that the Supreme Court has construed the Executive's
powers in foreign affairs very broadly. The Court stated in United States v. Curtis-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) that:
[i]f, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps seri-
ous embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and free-
dom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.
35. One questions whether the OFDI on reflection will really adopt this approach since
it could lead to the abuse of "window dressing." The investor could invest 1 million dollars
in Germany in 1968, and start construction on a plant with this capital; then he could either
(1) mortgage the assets (the plant) at a foreign bank at 80% of value or, (2) make a short
term loan with the foreign bank with the assets as security. The investor would then use the
proceeds of the loan to return the capital to the United States on or before December 31, 1968.
He leaves the capital in the United States for a couple of days thus fulfilling his obligations
for that year under the FDIR. Then on January 2, 1969, he returns the money to Europe,
pays off the loan, and starts to repeat the process. The regulations, however, provide that:
anything in this part to the contrary notwithstanding any transaction for the pur-
pose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding any of the provisions set
forth in this part may be disregarded in whole or in part for purposes of measuring
compliance with the provisions of this part.
FDIR § 1000.204, 33 Fed. Reg. 49 (1968).
36. Address by Don C. Cadle, supra note 4, at 5.
37. Id.
1969]
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We thus come to the final question: what is the future of the OFDI?
Cadle has stated that "we will have to learn to live with the regulations
or some effective substitute for at least a few years."88 The regulations re-
quire that in order to obtain a certificate for foreign borrowings, the inves-
tor must allege under oath that he will not make "any transfers of capital in
connection with the repayment of the borrowing within seven years . . . ."
Certainly the war in Vietnam and other national and domestic events that
affect our balance of payments will influence the life of the OFDI. How-
ever, the investor should probably be cautious and rather pessimistic since
federal agencies in Washington tend to develop a life of their own and are
rarely abolished.
38. Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
39. FDIR § 1000.1002(b)(1), 33 Fed. Reg. 11268 (1968). (Emphasis supplied.)
